It is against this background that the present chapter seeks to explore the relationship of French Euroscepticisms with ideas of national exceptionalism. It does so with a view to answering essentially two interrelated questions: How have ideas of national exceptionalism figured (or not) in the construction of Eurosceptic discourses in France? Does the French pattern of Euroscepticism appear as empirically exceptional relative to wider European trends in the period since Maastricht?
In responding to these core questions, the chapter initially provides a three part survey of the evolution of French party political Euroscepticism since the early 1990s. The first section underlines the strong presence of a Republican discourse of national exceptionalism in French debates surrounding the Maastricht Treaty. The following two sections then examine the differing ways in which that discourse has been displaced or subsumed on the right and the left respectively in the ensuing 15 years. An extensive concluding section returns to the questions of both discursive exceptionalism and empirical exceptionality on the basis of this survey, further placing French experience in the context of wider European developments and dilemmas.
The defence of the 'modèle républicain' and 'social nationalism'
French 'Euroscepticism' or 'souverainisme' could traditionally be understood in terms of the discursive construction of a fundamental 'misfit' between the French polity and its European counterpart, in which a distinctive 'Republican model' ['modèle républicain'] is portrayed as imperiled by the unchecked development of a European federalism. The clash of the national 'Republican' and European 'federal' models is partly one of templates of governance, the former resting on a strongly unitary conception of political power in opposition to the necessarily more diffuse or pluralistic operation of a multi-level and multi-national system of governance. In this, the French dilemma is that of all 'simple polities', as identified by Vivien Schmidt (2006) , in adapting to the demands of the complex realities of EU governance. That clash, however, assumes a deeper resonance in the French case, insofar as the historic construction of the French Republican model is one which may -and often has -been interpreted as demanding that national sovereignty be preserved as a necessary precondition for the maintenance of meaningful democratic deliberation and civic integration. The argument, in this vein, runs that only within the bounds of the nation, linked by a shared language and (civic) culture in a community of destiny,
